Prismo is just a dream of a wrinkled old man

Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism

Thomas McCarthy

哈贝马斯

对康德实践理性的重构

理性自省到交往理性

it is geared like Kant's ethics to what everyone could rationally will to be binding on everyone alike; but it shifts the frame of reference from Kant's solitary, reflecting, moral consciousness to the community of moral subjects in dialogue; and it replaces his Categorical Imperative with a procedure of practical argumentation aimed at reaching reasoned agreement among those subject to the norms in question. Moreover, by requiring that perspective taking be general and reciprocal, discourse ethics builds a moment of empathy or "ideal role-taking" into the representation of the ideal procedure for arriving at reasoned agreement

possible to read Habermas's extensive writings on politics and society as a protracted examination of the psychological, cultural, and institutional precondition's of, and barriers to, the imple-mentation of practical discourses. 

公共与非公共

罗尔斯

公共:与政府相关 governmental and quasi-governmental venues and functions

非公共:与政府无关的公民行动(而在哈贝马斯眼中这是公共领域的核心)

   非公共理性不是私人理性

   公共讨论的边界:宪法本质/基本正义(basic justice)

   公共讨论的范围:正义与其他存在于重叠共识中的政治价值(不存在针对特定道德、宗教或哲学的特定理由)

   对公共理性的限制包括程序和内容(理性原则,相关性标准,证据原则;避免在基本问题上依赖有争议的论证)

   哈贝马斯对于重审共识有更高的要求

Because social-political critique often addresses basic rights, principles, and values to challenge existing understandings and to persuade citizens to view fundamental issues in a different light, it is a public use of reason that sometimes requires transgressing an established overlapping consensus. From that standpoint, Rawls's con-ception seems to place undue restrictions on the use of public forums to press for basic structural changes. 

  政治中立性何以可能?

  罗尔斯将区分公共与私人的任务赋予个体,这要求个体处于高度的自我监视状态,产生类似于康德自律自我/他律自我的区分

  哲学问题应与政治相分离

罗尔斯的理论无法支持政治讨论的开放性并容纳更为根本的变革(如民权、女权)

可能的思路:将政治秩序视为经验问题,是大量因素上的动态平衡,一个民主社会的稳定并不单纯依赖于政治概念上的共识

罗尔斯“稳定性”与哈贝马斯“有效性”存在概念上的相似

罗尔斯:合理多元主义

哈贝马斯:程序主义+价值多元主义——哈贝马斯的政治共识是否可能达成?

矛盾:不可解决的价值冲突应该从程序中去除,但去除一部分价值观的协商不可能保持中立性;将所有价值纳入协商只能形成力量的相对平衡而非理性共识

 问题:A.价值商议的可能性?价值是否可以讨价还价?(很多存在争议的问题并非用协商解决,而是诉诸投票)

             B.讨论的抽象化:当发现某些价值并不具有真正的普遍性的时候,一种解决方式是将其进一步抽象化,即更接近于罗尔斯的共识概念

That is to say, the level of abstraction at which pluralistic socie-ties could hope to secure general agreement amid the play of social, cultural, and ideological differences might well be similar to that of Rawls's political conception.

可能的思路:协商是产生合法性的途径而非解决具体问题的途径

  their under-lying agreement with the operative political conception ofjustice may rationally motivate them (in Habermas's broader sense of the term 'rational') to consent to laws they regard as substantively unwarranted. 

判断的负担(burdens ofjudgment)理性人之间因为种种原因无法达成公式是完全可能的

行动者与观察者的分裂

思想来源:罗尔斯:16-17世纪宗教战争 哈贝马斯:18-19世纪公共领域

行动者:希望自己行动的理由得到所有人的支持

观察者:理解自己的理由将有部分人不认可

罗尔斯倾向于观察者视角,哈贝马斯倾向于行动者视角

  the concern with stability in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism limits the scope of what may count as good reasons in matters of public justification.

哈贝马斯的路径能使政治领域容纳更多问题,并将创造“共同基础”的任务留给行动者本身

如果以罗尔斯的逻辑进行演绎,讨论基本正义、保持政治讨论的开放性是可能的

We are not forced to choose between sectarianism and civility, in Rawls's sense; there is also the option of mutual respect and an accommodation of social, cultural, and ideological differences within democratic deliberation.The virtues associated with this option have been familiar since Socrates: open-mindedness, avoidance of dogmatism, a willingness to discuss differ-ences, to listen to others, to take their views seriously, and to change our minds, an ability to see things from the perspectives of others, to weigh judiciously the pros and cons of issues, and so on.

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